ShShMob16 Datasec Handbook

This handbook is based on "Information Security for Journalists" from the Logan Handbook Series Commissioned by the Centre for Investigative Journalism. Authors: Arjen Kamphuis & Silkie Carlo, shortened by Katrin Rönicke & Marie Gutbub. Creative Commons Licence. (CC BY-NC- SA 4.0)
The original handbook can be downloaded here: http://tcij.org/resources/handbooks/infosec/

Disclaimer

Since attack technologies are always changing and much of their use is entirely secret, we rarely confidently know the exact threats; when, where and to whom they apply; or the efficacy of our defences.
Therefore, it is down to you to perform a personal risk assessment and design an appropriate defensive response during the course of reading this book.
You may also want to factor in practicalities: some users may compromise their InfoSec, whilst aware of the risks, to meet other practical demands in their work, whereas some users practise sophisticated InfoSec above their perceived need because they find it practically doable.

Some basic questions you may wish to ask yourself when threat modelling for your InfoSec strategies are:

The threats will change, with time, but so too will the technologies available to protect journalists and citizens. So, it is important to understand InfoSec in theory, and to always continue learning about InfoSec in practice.

Your security and/or encryption methods will only be effective if each level of your system is secure. You can send your emails with unbreakable encryption, or use the strongest conceivable passwords, but if your system is hacked, or otherwise vulnerable, your efforts may be futile, as your encryption can be circumvented without any need to break it.
Depending on your risk level and the sophistication of your adversary, protection strategies range from simply keeping your laptop or phone on you at all times, to using a second-hand, cash-bought, laptop and practising robust InfoSec, during a specific project.

Despite the fact that the pervasive surveillance of law-abiding citizens almost certainly contravenes international human rights laws, use of certain privacy tools can be illegal.
Several of the privacy tools discussed in this handbook are cryptographic tools. This cryptography may be illegal, or require a license, in several countries including China, Cuba, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, North Korea, Singapore, Sudan, and Syria.
When entering some of these countries, you may need to declare any encryption technology on your laptop. You should consider the legal implications of using cryptography and makeinformed decisions about where and when it is safe for you to do so.
You can find out more about cryptography laws for each country here: http://www.cryptolaw.org/




Chapter 1: Safe Browsing

A web browser is the software you use to access the World Wide Web. For many of us, web browsing is 'The Internet', and in many senses it is a window to the world.

Web browsing risks:

  • Data collection of your identity
  • Data collection of your browsing behaviours, including the pages you have visited, and when
  • Data collection of your passwords and autofill information
  • Data collection of your location (and previous locations)
  • Malware (malicious software, sometimes spyware) injections
  • Being blocked from accessing certain sites
  • Being blocked from using anonymous browsers

InfoSec action:

  • Use a general purpose browser, with privacy-enhancing extensions, for daily activities
  • Use the Tor browser for anonymous browsing, for censorship resistance, and to hide your real location

Firefox

A popular open source web-browser
For Windows, download Firefox for your operating system and language at www.getfirefox.com.
On Linux distributions, Firefox should already be installed.

Extensions

A general-purpose browser is certain to make your identity, location and activity available. However, there are some extensions we can use to increase our privacy and security somewhat.
You can install these extensions directly in your browser: click on the menu, then Add-ons > Get Add-ons and use the search bar to find the extensions.

We particularly recommend the following open source extensions:


Tor

https://www.torproject.org/

About Tor

The Tor browser was especially designed for anonymity by routing all its traffic through the Tor network. Therefore, this browser prevents internet providers storing accurate information about your web browsing history.

The Tor network is a global network of computers called Tor nodes that have encrypted connections with each other. When the Tor browser starts, it will connect to one of these nodes. This node will connect to a second node that will in turn connect to a third node. These nodes could be anywhere in the world, and the first and third node will not be aware of each other. The third node will connect to the wider internet and fetch webpages from the sites you're visiting.

Those sites will not be able to see where you are or who you are (as long as you do not identify yourself by logging into services associated with your real identity).

Tor-schema

Staying anonymous

The latest version of the Tor browser gives users a security slider to determine their security options. In the Tor browser, click on the green onion (to the left of the address bar) and select Privacy and Security Settings to see the slider and the various options. The slider is set to low by default, which increases usability.
To benefit from the high level of privacy that Tor can offer, or if you need to browse anonymously, you should set the slider to the highest level.

Do not open documents (such as .doc and .pdf) downloaded via Tor while still being online. These document formats can contain elements that independently connect to the internet, thereby revealing your real IP address. Make sure you are offline first or use a separate computer for working with such documents.

Don't run bittorrent over Tor since this may betray your real IP address and will consume disproportionate amounts of capacity on the Tor network.

Make sure you use the latest version of the Tor browser. You will be alerted on the Tor browser homepage when updates are available, or you can click on the green onion in the browser window (to the left of the address bar) to Check for Tor Browser update.

Install Tor

Mac, Windows:
Download and install the Tor browser for your operating system at https://www.torproject.org/ following the installation instructions on the site.

Linux/Ubuntu:
Download the Tor browser for Linux at https://www.torproject.org/, and select Save file. Wait for the download to complete.
In your file directory, go to Downloads (or wherever you saved the download), right click on the Tor download, and select Extract here. Open the extracted file (e.g. tor-browser_en-US), and click Tor browser setup.

Start Tor

You now have the option whether to Connect or Configure. Unless your network provider blocks access to the Tor network (in which case, refer to our next section Bridges), select Connect.
The Tor browser should now launch. The Tor browser setup icon in your file directory should now be Tor browser – this is your Tor launch icon. You can drag this icon to the desktop or lock it to the launch bar to make your Tor launcher easily accessible.

Bridges

If the network provider you are using (this may be the entire country or just a University network) blocks access to the Tor network, you can use 'bridges' to achieve access. Bridges are 'private' Tor relays (nodes or computer points that receive traffic on the Tor network and pass it along) that are less likely to be blocked, and thus help circumvent censorship.

1. Launch the Tor Browser.
2. Click on the green onion (to the left of the address bar) and click Tor Network Settings > tick My ISP blocks connections to the Tor network.
3. You now have a box to enter one or more bridges - strings of numbers that identify a Tor relay.
4. To get bridges, go to https://bridges.torproject.org or if you cannot access that site, send an email to bridges@torproject.org, from a gmail.com or yahoo.com email address, with the line get bridges by itself in the body of the message, and bridges should be sent back to you.

Using a bridge can be an extremely slow way of connecting to the internet, but if you need it to circumvent censorship, it works very well.




Chapter 2: Passwords

Passwords are a key line of defence at all levels of information security.
However, bear in mind that passwords to online accounts are mainly a defence against non-state hackers (who are also able to obtain increasingly sophisticated commercial password cracking programs). There may be backdoor access at a state level to your online accounts, ultimately rendering a password irrelevant.
So, whilst strong passwords are always a good idea, passwords that protect your system (e.g. hard disk encryption) and your encryption programs are far more important than passwords to online accounts.

Risks:

  • Forgetting and losing passwords
  • Overriding passwords by backdoor access (online accounts)
  • Hacking (relatively unsophisticated password hacking)
  • Password cracking (sophisticated)
  • Key logger
  • Being coerced into revealing a password

InfoSec action:

  • Learn how to create strong passwords
  • Use KeePassX password manager (if you trust your system). KeePassX is an open source password manager
    that can generate and store usernames and passwords in an encrypted, local database, protected by your master password.
  • Store the most important passwords in your head only

Schneier scheme

You should use manually created passwords to encrypt your whole system, any encrypted USB stick or highly important file (e.g. source documents), and your password manager. These important passwords should be stored in your human memory only, and therefore need to be memorable.
Of course, to minimalise any damage should a password be compromised, you should avoid re-using passwords.

To manually create a password, we recommend the "Schneier scheme", a method advocated by Bruce Schneier, the internationally renowned cryptographer and security expert.
Schneier advises taking a memorable sentence and initialising, symbolising, and numbering the words to turn it into a password.

For example, "This little piggy went to market" might become "tlpWENT2m".
That nine-character password won't be in anyone's dictionary. Choose your own sentence, something personal, but not obviously related to you through public data.
Here are some examples:

(Of course, do not use any of the above examples: now that they have been used, they are invalid as strong password options).

Using KeePassX

KeePassX is a password manager that stores usernames and passwords in a local encrypted database, protected by a master password. It also comes with PWGen, a strong random password generator.

Linux/Ubuntu:

You can download KeepassX here: https://www.keepassx.org/downloads.
On Mac, follow the instructions to install. Default installation is fine.
On Windows, extract the file and then follow the instructions. Default installation is fine.

Linux/Ubuntu:

Download KeepassX directly in the software manager.

To create a new password database:
File > New database
Create a strong master password that will protect your password database.
You can then name your database file and choose the location where it will be saved.

To create a new password group:
Groups > New groups
(e.g. "email" group, for your email usernames and passwords)

To add a new password:
Click on a group > Entries > Add new entry
Here you have the option of entering a password, or generating a random one (click Gen).
If you click on the eye icon, you can see the text of the password. Otherwise, it will remain obscured.

To retrieve a password:
When you have added a password to a group, you can right click on the desired password and select copy password to clipboard. You can then paste it in to a login form.




Chapter 3: Instant Messaging

Instant messaging is a great way to start and maintain conversations with a source. It is very quick and easy to set up encrypted, 'off-the-record' (OTR) instant messengers (IM) – especially compared to setting up encrypted mail.

Using an OTR IM, you can discuss necessary security protocols before you continue conversing, meeting, emailing, sharing documents/information, and so on. It is also a useful tool for talking to colleagues if you are collaborating remotely on a project.

Off-the-record instant messaging allows you to have private conversations that are not only encrypted, but that are not stored, and therefore 'deniable'. That is to say, it is plausible that a chat purportedly including a chat account associated with you, is not actually you.

OTR IM uses public keys that are used to verify a contact really is who they purport to be. However, every time you begin a new chat with a contact (who has been verified by their public key), the chat is encrypted using new, throwaway keys. Don't worry – you don't have to do or even see this yourself – this is under-the-bonnet encryption that the messenger client does it for you.

You can use OTR encryption for different kinds of chat protocols. We recommend using jabber.

Install Tor-messenger

In this handbook we will explain how to use Tor-messenger, a messenging client that automatically connects over Tor.

Alternatively you could use Pidgin (Windows, Linux) or Adium (Mac).
You can find a tutorial on http://tcij.org/resources/handbooks/infosec/chapter-6-instant-messaging.

Mac, Windows:
Download and install the Tor browser for your operating system at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorMessenger#Downloads following the installation instructions on the site.

Linux/Ubuntu:
Download the Tor browser for Linux at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorMessenger#Downloads, and select Save file. Wait for the download to complete.
In your file directory, go to Downloads (or wherever you saved the download), right click on the Tor download, and select Extract here. Open the extracted file, and click Tor messenger setup.

Start Tor-messanger

You now have the option whether to Connect or Configure. Unless your network provider blocks access to the Tor network (in which case, refer to our next section Bridges), select Connect.
The Tor browser should now launch. The Tor browser setup icon in your file directory should now be Tor browser – this is your Tor launch icon. You can drag this icon to the desktop or lock it to the launch bar to make your Tor launcher easily accessible.

Create an IM account

Like e-mail, Jabber is decetralized: you can pick an existing server of your choice or run your own.
The registration for some servers happens directly in your chat client, for others you can or need to register an account in a browser.
You can find a list of free, public and secure Jabber servers on https://xmpp.net/directory.php. Make sure you pick a server with good security grades.

In this handbook we will user Systemli Jabber server.
To register an accout, visit https://www.systemli.org/en/service/xmpp.html. Scroll down and click Register an account. Enter the username of your choice and a strong password, then answer the question.
Your account is now registered; your Jabber address will look like this: username@jabber.systemli.org.

Add your account to Tor-messenger

When youo start Tor-messenger for the first time, the Account Wizard window should open automatically.
If this is not the case (or if you have used Tor-messenger before), click Tools > Accounts in the top bar; then click New Account in the Account window.

The first window allows you to select the protocol you will use. Click XMPP (the technical term for "jabber"), then click Next.
In the next window, first type the username of the account that had been previously created. Then type the domain of your jabber address (we use jabber.systemli.org) in the Domain bar.
Make sure the box Create this new account on the server is unchecked, as you have already created your account. Then click Next.

The next window asks you to type your password. However, adding your password here will save it and make it easier to log in your account if your computer is stolen. We strongly recommend to avoid this: simply leave the password box empty, and click Next.
In the last window, you can give yourself an alias (a nickname) if you want. Then click Next, and Finish.

You can now connect to your account: in the Accounts window, click on the name of your account, then click Connect and enter your password.

Add contacts to your account

In the top bar of your Tor-messenger window, go to File > Add Contact.
You can now type in the full address of your contact in the Account line, then click OK.

By default, Tor-messenger doesn't show your contacts when they are offline. If you want to see your full contact list (when you will have added contacts), right-click on the white background of the contact window and click Show Offline Contacts.

When your contact is next online, they will receive an authorisation request from you.
Once your contact has confirmed your request, you will recieve notification saying that your contact wants to chat with you. Click on Allow to chat.

To chat with your contact, double-click on their address to open a conversation window.
This will work only if your contact is online too.

First chat

Before chatting, start an encrypted conversation: click on the red padlock symbol in the upper-right corner of the conversation window, then click on Start private conversation.
If you have not yet authentified your contact, a black banner will appear on the top of the conversation window to invite you to verify your contact.
To do so, click on Verify: the verification window should appear.

You can authenticate either by

Ideally, you will use fingerprint verification and if you know the person well enough, you will also ask a question of each other, that only the other person would know the answer to.
You can selet the method of your choice in the upper menu.

Checking fingerprints

You should ideally check one another's fingerprints by a communication method other than IM (email, phone).
If the fingerprints match, confirm the verification by selecting Yes in the menu under the fingerprints, then click Verify to confirm.

If there is not a secure means by which to check fingerprints, a mutual friend/third party on IM can pass on a partly redacted version of your fingerprint to the contact (e.g. 0---A7-0 D—706-D 2—65--1 --3D-9C2 0-57B—1), and the contact's fingerprint to you, for you both to check alongside the purported fingerprint shown.
Redacting parts of your fingerprint may help prevent a "man-in-the-middle" impersonation attack.

Chatting

The padlock symbol in your conversation window should now be green: you can start chatting with your contact.
Next time you will be able to start a private, verified conversation simply by clicking ont the padlock, and then select Start private conversation.
The fingerprint for your contact will be saved.

To end a conversation, always click on the green padlock symbol and select End private conversation. Then you can close the conversation window and log out of your jabber account.




Chapter 4: Email

Email is very likely the means by which you most frequently contact colleagues and sources. Vitally, it is the means by which a new source could contact you.

Therefore, having secure email, not only for everyday use with colleagues but as a secure channel for initial contact, is important for any investigative journalist or blogger.

The risks to your email communications include an adversary doing any of the following:

  • Reading email content
  • Reading subject header
  • Seeing who you are contacting, how often and when
  • Intercepting email attachments
  • “Man in the middle” attacks (an impersonator intercepting communications)
  • Seeing where you are emailing from (location)

InfoSec action:

  • Use strong passwords
  • Use a trustworthy email provider
  • Encrypt your email
  • Verify your keys
  • Put minimal information in your email subjects
  • Email from Tails (if/when you need to)
  • Use anonymous email addresses for select purposes

Email provider

An email provider that is "trustworthy" is one who has a good basic security infrastructure, and who won't hand over your data to an intelligence agency in a hurry. If you do not trust the country where the email provider is based, it is best not to use an email address there. For example, we know that the default position of the US and UK intelligence agencies is to record and store as many email communications as possible. Even if you don't feel your email communications to be of relevance to these agencies now, they will be retroactively accessible should you and/or your work become relevant in the future. So, if you don't trust the US approach to email privacy, be aware that the email providers based there (Outlook, Gmail, Riseup, etc....) may be subject to that approach. Some email providers are thought to be more co-operative than others, but unless you run your own server (or the organisation you work for runs their own server in a country with good privacy laws, like Switzerland or Iceland), we should assume that your emails and email metadata are not secure with any email provider. Other considerations are whether you have to hand over your mobile phone number, a postcode/address, or another of your email addresses in order to register an account with a provider, as you may want to avoid donating that information in future (and especially if/when you use an anonymous email address).

Email metadata

Metadata is data about data. Email metadata includes both the sender's and recipient's names, emails and IP addresses, server transfer information, date, time and time zone, unique identifier of email and related emails, content type and encoding, mail client login records with IP address, priority and categories, subject of email, status of the email, and any read receipt request.

This information is extensive and revealing alone, but many intelligence and law enforcement agencies (and in some cases, individual hackers) are also able to retrieve the full email content. You can't easily protect the metadata of your emails, so you should be minimalistic or obsfucatory in your subject line, and you may wish to hide your real location/IP address by using the Tor browser.

Note that email encryption does not hide metadata such as who you are talking to, the email subject, or your location (though you can hide your real location by using Tor/Tails). For people at all risk levels, it is a good idea to be minimalistic or obsfucatory in your subject line.

Email encryption

You can protect the privacy of your email content by using public key cryptography. Public key cryptography scrambles the content of your email into (thus far) unbreakable code using the recipient's public key. The encrypted email can then only be decrypted using the intended recipient's private key.

The following instructions recommend the GNU Privacy Guard, "GPG" (an open source implementation of Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP).
Using GPG, whilst very different to normal emailing, is not difficult and you will get used to it very quickly. Understanding exactly how it works, however, is slightly more challenging.

You can't encrypt or decrypt email from your smart phone. Whilst it is possible to set up on some Android phones, it is highly inadvisable because mobile phones are fundamentally insecure anyway.
Neither can you encrypt or decrypt mail in your web browser (unless you are using the Tails operating system): you will use the Thunderbird email client on your desktop, with the added encryption software, to encrypt and decrypt mail.

Finally, you can only send encrypted emails to other people who also use encrypted email. This used to be a rather small community of people but in a post-Snowden world, it is growing exponentially.

Key pairs

Keys are essentially unique long sets of numbers, and each user of email encryption has a key pair: a public key, and a private key.

Your public key: Your public key is what people will use to encrypt emails that they send to you.
Like listing a phone number in the phone book, you can choosewhether to list your public key on the public keyserver or not (if it is a secret or anonymous email account, you may not wish to upload the key to the keyserver). If you choose to list your public key on the keyserver, it will be openly available so that anyone can contact you securely.

Your private key: Your private key allows you to decrypt emails from others who have contacted you using your public key.
Although your public key is then freely available, the private key in the key pair is exactly that: private!
A private key corresponds to your public key, ensuring that no one else can have unauthorised use of your public key. You will probably never even see your private key: it lives and works under the bonnet of your GPG software.
The length, randomness, and sophistication of strong public key cryptography (4096 bit keys, as per our instructions below) are such that the encryption remains, as far as we know, unbreakable.

Verifying keys

Importantly, you should always verify that the keys of the people who you send encrypted mail to really do belong to your intended recipient. Although the email address belongs to the person you want to contact, there is a small chance (at high-risk levels) that their purported public key might not. This is known as a "Man-In-The-Middle" (MITM) attack: the covert interception of communications by the impersonation of a target. You need to make sure that both the email address and the public key definitely belong to the individual concerned. See verifying keys later in this chapter.

Installation instructions for encrypted email

What you need

Linux/Ubuntu:
Thunderbird email client and GPG encryption software
Ubuntu comes pre-loaded with Thunderbird (email client) and GPG encryption software.
Use the Ubuntu search tool on the top left hand of the desktop to find it.

Mac:
Download Thunderbird email client and GPG encryption software
You will need to download:

Windows:
Download Thunderbird email client and GPG encryption software
You will need to download:

How to install

(all operating systems)

Publicly list your public key

Uploading your public key to the keyserver is like listing your phone number in a phonebook. It allows people to search for your name/email address, and locate your public key in order to send you an encrypted email. This is very useful for journalists who invite encrypted mail and wish to protect source confidentiality.

However, if you are setting up encryption for an anonymous email address that you will use only to communicate with specific, high risk individuals, of course there is little to gain from uploading your public key to the keyserver.

We do not recommend uploading your first key to the server immediately after you have generated it. In the process of learning, people often compromise their first key pair or lose access to it. If you can afford taking some time to get used to email encryption, consider not publishing your key during the learning process. Instead, try to send encrypted emails (to friends, colleagues) on a regular basis and upload your key to the keyserver after a few weeks of practice.

1. Go to Enigmail > Key management.
2. Tick Display All Keys by Default.
3. Right click your email address, and select Upload Public Keys to Keyserver if you want people to be able to contact you.
The default keyserver (pool.sks-keyservers.net) is fine.

To search for anyone's public key

Search for a name/email address to see if a person has a public key listed, so you can send them encrypted mail (like searching for a number in a phonebook).

Enigmail > Key management > Keyserver (in the top toolbar) > Search for keys.
Enter the person's name or email address and browse the results. Tick the email address of anyone whose key you'd like to import and press ok.
Don't forget to verify the fingerprint before using the key!

Import a key

If you already have your contact's key on a file or online, but need to import it to your key manager on Thunderbird.

Verifying keys

Make sure that the person you think you are communicating with is certainly who they say they are.

In Thunderbird, go to Enigmail > Key management > right-click a selected email address > Key Properties. Here you will see the person's key fingerprint.
You can verify that the key does indeed belong to the person by exchanging fingerprints by another communication means (ideally in person, if not possible, on the phone, on their website), and checking they match exactly.

In the same window you can then click Certify > select if and how well you have checked the fingerprint. To avoid uploading this signature by mistake on the keyservers, we recommend cheching the Local signature box. Then click OK.
In the same windows you can also click Change and select how much you trust that the key does in fact belong to the individual concerned. Then click OK.

Send an encrypted email!

When you have completed the set up, send a test email to someone else who has encrypted mail. Import their key or find it on the keyserver, and be sure to verify it and sign your trust of their key before you try to send an email.

Choose a recipient whose key you have already imported, verified, and set owner trust for. Write your email, and before you click Send, click on the padlock icon to close it and encrypt the message. Make sure the pen icon next to the padlock icon is selected too: it confirms that your message is signed. Both icons should be yellow.

Press Send, and the confirmation box should tell you that the email is both signed and encrypted (if not, go back and check you ticked to encrypt).
Click Send Message, and your encrypted email will be sent!

Share your public key with an individual

The first time you send a contact an encrypted email, you should attach your public key so that they can respond by encrypting an email back to your key. In the email compose window, to the right of the encryption padlock and signing pencil icons, there is an option to Attach My Public Key. Select this to attach your public key to the email. Alternatively, click Enigmail> > Attach My Public Key.

Protecting your identity and location when emailing

At higher risk levels, for those who wish to hide the real identities of themselves and/or others communicating, anonymous email accounts should be used, unassociated with any other aspect of your online identity - they should not be connected with you in any way. Gmail and Hotmail tend to request a phone or alternate email address, so these providers are not ideal for anonymous accounts. In many countries, GMX and Yandex, allow users to create accounts without such identifying information.

However, if you create an anonymous email address from an internet connection that is associated with you, your anonymity may already be compromised. Furthermore, when you send and receive emails, you are doing so by connecting to the internet, thus your location is known by the internet provider (and potentially, an adversary). If you want your identity and location to be anonymous, you can use an anonymous account to send unencrypted emails through webmail on the Tor browser ; or you can use the Tails operating system, which hides the real location of all of your laptop's communications with the internet. Tails' desktop email client (which supports encryption) sends and receives information/mail to and from the internet through Tor, thus hiding the real location of the connection. You might only want to protect your location in the field rather than identity per se. For this, using the Tails operating system is the only answer.




Chapter 5: File and disk encryption

VeraCrypt

VeraCrypt is open source encryption software.

VeraCrypt works the same on Windows, Mac and Linux systems and the encrypted containers are cross-compatible between these systems. This allows you to work securely with other people without having to know what system they use.

VeraCrypt allows you to create an encrypted "container" that acts as a digital strongbox for files, locked by a password.
Once this box is created and filled with files it can be moved to an external storage device such as a USB drive, or sent over the internet to others.
Even if the file is intercepted, the strongbox will not reveal its contents to anyone who does not have the password.

Important! Do not forget your password, there is no other way to get to your data once it is encrypted. Losing you password means losing your data!

Encrypt with VeraCrypt




Chapter 6: File sharing

OnionShare

https://onionshare.org

OnionShare is an open source tool that lets you securely and anonymously (over the Tor network) share a file of any size.

OnionShare offers a secure method of file-sharing because it allows users to share files directly from computer to computer, across Tor connections, without uploading files to any third party’s server. Instead, the sender’s computer becomes the server for the purpose of the transfer.

OnionShare is easy to install and use on Windows, Mac, Ubuntu and Tails.
Installation on Ubuntu does require minimal use of the command line.
You can download OnionShare and find installation instructions here: https://onionshare.org

Using OnionShare:

To send files using OnionShare, you must have the Tor browser running in the background.
You must also use the Tor browser to download files shared via OnionShare.

The sender chooses the files they wish to share, and OnionShare makes the files available for download via a URL, accessible via the Tor browser.
As the recipient downloads the file, the sender can see the download progress and completion.
If you are concerned about focused surveillance and attempts to intercept your shared files, you should be careful to share the URL with your contact securely (for example, over encrypted OTR chat or encrypted email) and anonymously (for example, using new anonymous throwaway email accounts created on the Tor browser).
When the download is complete, or when the sender closes OnionShare, the files are completely removed from the internet (unless you untick Stop sharing automatically in OnionShare, which enables the files to be downloaded multiple times).

Further instructions for use can be found here: https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare




Chapter 7: Operating systems

If your hardware is secure against automated and pre-positioned surveillance, it is vital to prevent the introduction of software that will make the system vulnerable again. Even if you are operating at low-risk levels, using the right software can help protect the security of your data and communications from automated and dragnet surveillance.

The most important software on a computer, in addition to the firmware, is the operating system. This is the software that takes control of the computer as it boots up and is the interface through which you use the computer. In short, the operating system tells the computer what to do, and how to do it. Popular operating systems include versions of Windows (e.g. XP, Vista, 8, 10), OS X (for Mac), and Linux distributions.

We now know that intelligence agencies often have access to "backdoors" in popular operating systems, which enable them to gain covert access to users’ data.

Threats associated with operating systems:

  • Malware, viruses
  • Surveillance ‘backdoors’ within an operating system, accessible to the intelligence community

Two key measures are important for protection against operating system threats:

  • Use an open source operating system (for medium risk)
  • Use Tails, an amnesic, incognito operating system (for high - top risk)
  • To increase confidence that your operating system does not have potential surveillance "backdoors" (i.e. that it cannot be abused for surveillance purposes), it should be open source’. Open source software is freely distributed software for which the source-code, the very fabric of the operating system, is "open" and publicly available. This allows independent experts to view the source code anytime, and verify that there are no security flaws in the makeup of the operating system. A full, ten-point definition is available at www.opensource.org/osd.
    Furthermore, open source operating systems are less susceptible to malware (malicious software, typically spyware) and viruses. This is because they are much less frequently used than proprietary operating systems and have a correspondingly low market share.
    Open source software is also known as "free software", not only for the freedom of access to its source code, but because it is also distributed on a free/donations-only basis.
    It should be noted that open source software is only as trustworthy as the trust one puts in the expertise and frequency with which the source code is created and examined. However, open source software that is widely used is more likely to be frequently examined, and is preferable (at least for InfoSec purposes) to closed source software.

    Operating systems by Microsoft and Apple (e.g. Windows, OS X) are closed source, and are expected to contain surveillance backdoors accessible to GCHQ, the NSA and allied interests. Microsoft’s operating systems are particularly unsuitable, since more of its code is closed source than Apple’s code, and their systems are more susceptible to malware and viruses. Such closed source operating systems are unsuitable for important data and communications if you think you, or someone you are communicating with, could be (or become) a target of surveillance.

    Linux

    Linux is the leading open source, community developed, operating system. There are many different versions of Linux operating systems that you can use: Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora, Arch, etc.

    Tails

    https://tails.boum.org/

    Use an amnesic, incognito operating system for the greatest security: Tails. Tails stands for "The Amnesic Incognito Live System".
    It is an open source, Linux-based operating system that protects users’ privacy and anonymity.

    Amnesic: because no trace of your computer use is left on the system after shut down
    Incognito: because it is privacy and security orientated, accessing internet anonymously by default, and thus circumventing any censorship

    Tails is purposefully designed as an anti-surveillance system, and comes with several built-in (entirely open source) security-oriented applications:

    Tails is designed for use from a USB stick independently of the computer's original operating system. This means that you can remove your laptop’s hard disk drive (recommended for high-risk work), but still boot up the laptop through a Tails USB stick. Alternatively, you can put a Tails USB stick into a computer with the hard disk drive intact, and boot up via Tails: the machine will ignore the original hard disk and operating system, and run from the USB drive with Tails instead.

    The provision of a ‘mini system’ on a Tails USB stick makes it ideal for sensitive journalistic projects. Your machine can essentially be "clean" with no trace of your work on there, and your documents can be stored on the highly portable, inexpensive USB stick.

    Tails even comes preloaded with open source editing software such as LibreOffice for creating, reading and editing documents, PiTiVifor editing videos, and Audacity for editing sound.

    It is wise to have separate Tails USB sticks for separate projects, to spread your identity trace and minimise the risk, should you lose a USB stick.
    If appropriate, you could also give a prepared Tails USB stick to your source, with a few instructions, so they have secure means of communicating with you.
    In high risk scenarios, you may wish to use Tails on an entirely separate machine to your usual laptop.

    Using Tails

    Booting from USB

    You need to set your machine to boot from USB – a setting that is
    located in the BIOS menu of your laptop. You can access the BIOS
    menu as your machine powers up. Before attempting this, you may
    wish to search online to find out which key to press to access the
    BIOS menu on your particular laptop. On many machines an
    entering setup message appears as it powers up, informing you
    that you can press [key] to enter BIOS/setup/system configuration,
    in which case you can follow that instruction. It is often a key such
    as f1, F2, F3, F12 or DEL.
    You may also wish to research how, via your particular machine’s
    BIOS menu, to boot the machine from the USB drive. Insert the USB
    stick into the laptop whilst switched off, then boot up and enter the
    BIOS menu. This setting may be in a menu item such as Startup >
    Boot; or a menu tab such as Boot, Boot options, or Boot selection
    menu
    . Select your USB drive, or make sure your USB drive is top of
    any boot priority order (if an item on the list has a + it means it
    has a submenu, where your USB listing may be hiding!). You can
    often change the order using + and – keys. Navigate to the Exit or
    Save and exit menu, and select Exit saving changes (or similar)
    option to make sure your boot preference has been saved.
    So: power up the laptop with the USB stick already inserted, enter
    the BIOS menu, and opt to boot from your USB drive.

    When you boot up in Tails, you will see a screen load up with options Live and Live failsafe.
    Use the arrow keys to highlight Live and hit the enter key.

    You will then be offered, More options?. It is not essential that you enter this menu, unless you need to configure Tails to circumvent Tor censorship.
    Otherwise you can select no, ‘Login’, and start exploring Tails.
    If you do select yes for more options, you will see:

    Using Tails via bridges/circumventing censorship

    This helps people to connect to the Tor network in situations where their network disallows Tor connections. Bridges are Tor relays (nodes or computer points that receive traffic on the Tor network and pass it along) that help circumvent censorship.

    When you boot up using the Tails USB stick and are offered More options?,select Yes and continue.

    Under Network configuration, select This computer’s internet connection is censored, filtered of proxied. You need to configure bridge, firewall or proxy settings.
    Then, when you connect to the internet the Tor browser bundle window will appear asking the same question.
    If the latter option applies, click Configure. You’ll be asked if your ISP blocks / censors connections to the Tor network. If you need to configure bridges, select yes here and press next.

    You now have a box to enter one or more bridges: strings of numbers that identify a Tor relay. To get bridges, go to https://bridges.torproject.org or if you cannot access that site, send an email to bridges@torproject.org from a gmail.com or yahoo.com email address, with the line get bridges by itself in the body of the message, and some should be sent back to you. Using a bridge can be an extremely slow way of connecting to the internet, but if you need it to circumvent censorship, it works very well.

    Creating a persistent volume in Tails

    Creating persistent storage space on your Tails USB stick.

    To create a persistent volume in Tails, go to Applications > Tails > Configure persistent volume.
    Once you have entered a (very strong) password, you can choose what types of files you will save in the persistent volume. You could select all types, to keep your options open.
    Now, every time you boot up with the Tails USB stick, you will be asked two questions: Use persistence?’ and More options? (as before). If you click Yes to use persistence and enter the password, you can access any data (e.g. configured email client, IM client, password manager, or files) you have saved to the persistent volume in previous sessions.

    OpenPGP encryption applet

    Because all internet connections on Tails run through the Tor network, connections to your email provider via your email client will also be run through Tor. Users of some email providers sometimes have problems configuring their email accounts with Icedove through Tails, because the connection is re-routed through the Tor network to disguise your location.
    Tails offers an alternative method you can use to encrypt email and email attachments.

    Rather than using an email client to encrypt the entire email, you can highlight text and encrypt it to the desired recipient’s key, before pasting the encrypted text into an email (e.g. when composing email on the web browser).

    Upgrading Tails

    Your Tails system should automatically look for, and download, updates. It is important to keep your system updated.
    After booting Tails and connecting to Tor, if an upgrade is available, a dialog box appears and proposes you to upgrade the system.

    However, it can often take a while for Tails to connect to the internet after booting, in which case it may be unable to check for upgrades at start up.
    You can check for upgrades anytime by opening the Terminal (black box icon on the top toolbar on the Tails desktop) and typing the following command:

    tails-upgrade-frontend-wrapper

    And press enter. Tails will check for updates, or inform you whether your system is up to date.

    More information on upgrading Tails, and troubleshooting when Tails does not upgrade automatically, can be found on the Tails website:
    https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/upgrade/index.en.html




    Chapter 8: Ressources

    If you need more training

    Learn more about Information Security in CIJ's Information Security for Journalists handbook by Arjen Kamphuis and Silkie Carlo, on which this tutorial is based.
    http://tcij.org/resources/handbooks/infosec/

    Reach out to organizations that help journalists and/or activists:

    To read

    How your smartphone tracks you
    https://www.bof.nl/2014/07/30/how-your-innocent-smartphone-passes-on-almost-your-entire-life-to-the-secret-service/

    Micah Lee's articles about security on The Intercept
    https://theintercept.com/staff/micah-lee/